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Abstract 
A growing number of innovation policies rely on publicly funded innovation 
intermediaries to provide knowledge-intensive services to firms, particularly small and 
medium-sized ones. The performance of innovation intermediaries is often assessed using 
indicators that need to be closely aligned with policy objectives to be effective. However, 
this alignment is difficult to achieve and is often overlooked in practice. We analyse the 
relationship between performance indicators and the behaviour of intermediaries by 
examining a case study of innovation intermediaries funded with public resources in 
Tuscany (Italy). The intermediaries implemented actions that allowed them to achieve 
their performance targets rapidly. However, due to a misalignment between indicators 
and policy objectives, these actions were not entirely consistent with the latter. After 
reviewing the literature on this key issue, we build on our findings to suggest how to 
design performance indicators that can induce intermediaries to more effectively support 
the achievement of policy objectives.  
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1. Introduction 
Intermediary organisations that support firm-level and collaborative innovation—
often called knowledge or innovation intermediaries (henceforth: 
intermediaries)—have gained increasing prominence in knowledge-intensive 
economies (Howells, 2006; Lazaric et al., 2008; Meyer and Kearnes, 2013; 
Schlierf and Meyer, 2013). These organisations provide knowledge-intensive 
services, including support to university–industry collaborations, knowledge and 
technology mapping, technical assistance in research and development (R&D) 
projects, and the dissemination and commercialisation of research results (Bessant 
and Rush, 1995; Lynn et al., 1996; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Den Hertog, 
2000; Howells, 2006; Wright et al., 2008; Doganova, 2013; Kearnes, 2013; 
Wagner et al., 2014). While typical intermediaries include knowledge-intensive 
business services providers, technopoles, technology transfer agencies, science 
parks, and incubators, a wide range of organisations can perform at least some 
intermediary functions (Howells, 2006; Caloffi et al., 2015). 
A growing number of policies worldwide rely on intermediaries to support 
R&D, innovation, and technology transfer (Uotila et al., 2012; Meyer and 
Kearnes, 2013; Fiordelmondo et al., 2014; Knockaert et al., 2014). In many cases, 
these intermediaries receive public funds to provide knowledge-intensive services 
to firms in order to boost their innovation capabilities. Often, intermediaries are 
specifically given the responsibility of working with small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), which are less likely than large firms to carry out R&D 
activities systematically and are, therefore, often less innovative and fall prey 
more easily to cognitive lock-ins (Laranja et al., 2008).  
Policymakers often define performance targets for publicly funded 
intermediaries in order to induce them to act in accordance with policy objectives. 
The public policy literature has discussed how the setting of performance targets 
and the design of performance indicators to measure their attainment affect the 
behaviour of the assessed actors, particularly when public funding is made 
conditional on performance (Fitz-Gibbon, 1990; Langford et al., 2006; Compagni 
and Tediosi, 2012; Teixeira and Koryakina, 2013). However, little evidence exists 
about how performance targets are designed in the particular case of 
intermediaries or their effectiveness in aligning intermediaries’ behaviour with 
policy objectives. The case of publicly funded intermediaries is peculiar because 
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of the tension between the policymakers’ need to set performance targets—and 
related indicators to measure their achievement—that are simple, clear, and 
achievable within a relatively short time and the difficulty in measuring the actual 
performance of intermediation activities, whose effects are often invisible and 
ineffable (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008; Schlierf and Meyer, 2013) and can require a 
long time to manifest.  
We illustrate this problem and identify possible solutions based on a case 
study of a set of innovation intermediaries in the Italian region of Tuscany that 
were funded by the regional government between 2011 and 2014. We argue that 
the intermediaries’ performance was evaluated by means of indicators that were 
misaligned with the policy’s ultimate objectives. Consequently, the intermediaries 
adopted behaviours that, while allowing them to rapidly achieve their 
performance targets, did not fully support these objectives. We build on these 
findings to suggest how to design alternative performance indicators that can be 
used to induce intermediaries to more effectively support the achievement of 
policy objectives.  
The implications of these findings are relevant beyond the specific case of 
Tuscany. First, the set-up of the policy intervention that we studied is not unique: 
Not only have other Italian regions used similar indicators to evaluate the 
performance of innovation intermediaries, but some of these indicators are also 
among the most commonly used by policymakers around the world (Comacchio 
and Bonesso, 2012). Second, the misalignment between performance indicators 
and policy objectives is a problem for many innovation policies, inspired by an 
evolutionary approach that aims to improve the learning and cognitive capacities 
of firms and other actors (Laranja et al., 2008). While researchers look for 
appropriate methodologies for the ex post evaluation of these policies, 
policymakers often identify ex ante indicators that do not capture the intended 
effects of the programmes (European Commission, 2013). Our proposed approach 
to designing effective performance indicators can, therefore, be applied to a broad 
array of policies. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the literature 
on publicly funded innovation intermediaries and on the indicators used to 
measure their performance, and we identify the main obstacles to devising 
indicators that are aligned with policy objectives. Section 3 presents the main 
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characteristics of Tuscany’s policy programme supporting innovation 
intermediaries, as well as our data sources. Section 4 explores the effects of the 
indicators implemented in this programme on the intermediaries’ behaviour. 
Section 5 discusses how to better align performance indicators for innovation 
intermediaries with policy objectives. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Key challenges in setting performance-based incentives for publicly funded 
innovation intermediaries  
In recent years, numerous national and regional governments have funded 
innovation intermediaries with the objective to support innovation and technology 
transfer processes (Uotila et al., 2012; Meyer and Kearnes, 2013; Knockaert et al., 
2014; Fiordelmondo et al., 2014). These publicly funded intermediaries are 
expected to improve the resources (information and networks) and capabilities 
(competences and skills) of the economic actors in their national or regional 
innovation systems, thus leading them to change their innovative behaviours and 
achieve better innovation performance (Metcalfe, 1995; Lambooy and Boschma, 
2001; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; Lundvall and Borrás, 2005; Laranja et al., 
2008; Dogdson et al., 2011). Intermediaries can support other economic actors, 
particularly firms, through a range of activities. They can boost firms’ innovation 
capabilities by providing training (e.g. in the use of specific technologies) or 
support services (e.g. support with patent search) or by intermediating the 
provision of services that complement their competencies (Vonortas, 2002; 
Bessant and Rush, 2005). The intermediaries’ support is particularly important for 
SMEs, which often lack the ability to acquire useful knowledge, competencies, or 
technologies and implement them into products and services (Belitz and Lejpras, 
2016). More fundamentally, some firms may even be unaware of what 
knowledge, competencies, or technologies they are lacking (Brusco, 1992; 
Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002). Through activities such as knowledge and 
technology mapping, intermediaries can help firms to gain awareness of what they 
need in order to find the most appropriate ways to obtain it. 
Intermediaries can also stimulate productive interactions and collaborative 
innovation by creating connections between people in different organisations; 
they can do so through focused networking activities, such as targeted 
introductions and meetings, as well as through the provision of interaction spaces 
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(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1998; Acworth, 2008; Kodama, 2008; Rossi et al., 
2010). This can be particularly helpful to newly created firms and SMEs, which 
are usually less open to external collaborations than other organisations (Rothwell 
and Dogdson, 1991).  
Policies that rely on the public funding of innovation intermediaries 
usually target one or more of the generic objectives that were briefly outlined 
above. To induce innovation intermediaries to pursue the policies’ intended 
objectives, the allocation of public funding is often conditional on the 
achievement of performance targets. However, for performance-based incentives 
to be effective, it is important for performance indicators to be closely aligned 
with policy objectives. The available evidence suggests that this is not often the 
case. Studies of policy implementation have shown that performance indicators 
are usually designed heuristically, often based on past experience, rather than 
grounded theoretically (Sizer, 1979; Jesson and Mayston, 1990; Curristine, 2005; 
Molas-Gallart and Davies, 2006). Heuristic approaches can result in indicators 
that focus only on a few activities, or on relatively unimportant ones, just because 
they are easier to measure (Robichau and Lynn, 2009; Rossi and Rosli, 2015). 
Such indicators are often ineffective not only because they provide a biased 
evaluation of performance but also because they create an implicit incentive 
system that alters the behaviour of the assessed units (Langford et al., 2006; 
Compagni and Tediosi, 2012; Teixeira and Koryakina, 2013) in ways that can be 
misaligned with policy objectives (European Commission, 2013). This is because 
the assessed units are incentivised to adopt strategies that, without necessarily 
being opportunistic, help them to comply with the indicators rather than with the 
ultimate goal of the policies.  
There is ample evidence of the interplay between performance indicators 
and organisational behaviour. For example, Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen (2012) 
showed how, in the case of the Forny technology transfer programme in Norway, 
using the number of spinoff companies as a performance indicator in order to 
allocate funding to technology transfer offices led these offices to launch too 
many spinoff firms at a stage of development that was too early, thereby resulting 
in a high rate of business failure. In Australia, the allocation of research funding to 
universities based on the number of publications led many institutions to publish 
as much as possible without regard for the quality of the publication outlets 
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(Schneider et al., 2016).  
The misalignment between performance indicators and policy objectives 
can arise because of some limitations inherent in performance measurement, 
which is a problem that is particularly evident in the case of innovation 
intermediaries. First, because the ease of performance measurement can vary 
across different activities, policymakers often design indicators that focus only on 
those activities that can be measured and disregard other activities that are not as 
easily measured but that may be equally or even more important. As a 
consequence, publicly funded organisations are likely to invest effort only in those 
activities that allow them to achieve good performance scores in the indicators 
(Davies, 1999). Second, for practical reasons, the information used to build 
performance indicators is usually collected over a relatively short period. As a 
consequence, publicly funded organisations prioritise activities that produce 
immediate outputs, which can be counted for performance measurement, and 
neglect activities that would yield results only over a longer time horizon than that 
considered by evaluators. 
Finally, performance indicators are often defined in terms of the production of 
specific, easily quantifiable outputs that are considered desirable in themselves 
(Comacchio and Bonesso, 2012). Instead, policy objectives usually relate to more 
complex, less quantifiable outcomes that should be achieved by targeted actors. 
Recently, numerous criticisms of output indicators have led to greater emphasis 
on the use of outcome indicators (or results indicators), also in the evaluation of 
regional policy (European Commission, 2014). However, the definition of 
outcome indicators per se does not guarantee the setting of appropriate 
behavioural incentives, unless these outcome indicators are aligned with policy 
objectives.  
In the case of innovation intermediaries, policy-relevant outcomes 
typically involve actors in the innovation system achieving specific benefits 
thanks to the intermediaries’ activities, such as firms’ improvement in terms of 
innovation capabilities, improvement in economic performance, or acquisition of 
new skills. Because they involve intangible processes of learning and capability 
development and concern different actors from those whose performance is 
evaluated, these outcomes are often difficult to quantify, and they may take a long 
time to be realised. As a consequence, policymakers are particularly likely to steer 
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away from measuring such outcomes. 
The misalignment between indicators and policy objectives can also arise 
for other, more political reasons than merely difficulties in performance 
measurement. Policymakers might set simple indicators because their real goal, 
beyond their official statements, is not to select the best and brightest, but to 
eliminate the worst. Policymakers could also avoid setting complex indicators and 
ambitious targets because they do not want the funded organisations, which are 
also part of their electorate, to fail to achieve their performance expectations. This 
is more likely to occur in regions in which the distance between policymakers and 
their voters is relatively short. Sometimes, policymakers intentionally conflate 
indicators with policy objectives. When policy objectives are complex or even 
conflicting, it is easier to find agreement regarding symbolic measures of 
performance that appear objective and uncontroversial (Matland, 1995; Molas-
Gallart and Castro-Martinez, 2007), rather than engage in fundamental 
discussions about the underlying aims of policy. In these cases, policymakers may 
encourage the pursuit of simple indicators for their own sake (Langford et al. 
2006), leading to an overlap between indicators and policy objectives (‘proxies 
becoming goals,’ in the words of Langford et al., 2006). 
Through our case study of publicly funded innovation intermediaries in the 
Italian region of Tuscany from 2011 to 2014, we show that the indicators used to 
measure the intermediaries’ attainment of their performance targets suffered from 
some of the limitations outlined above. They were misaligned with policy 
objectives, and they, consequently, induced intermediaries to behave in ways that 
did not serve the latter. Building on these findings, we discuss how indicators 
should have been designed to more effectively facilitate the achievement of policy 
objectives, and we derive some general implications for policy design. 
 
3. Tuscany’s innovation poles programme 
3.1. The policy’s objectives within the broader policy context 
In 2010, the regional government of Tuscany in Italy identified a set of key tech-
nologies/applications and launched a call for tender, inviting organisations to 
submit proposals for the creation of innovation poles in such technology areas for 
a three-year period (2011–2014). Innovation poles, which are a particular type of 
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innovation intermediary, were consortia among different organisations based in 
the region—universities and research centres, knowledge-intensive service pro-
viders, and firms. Such poles received some public funds to provide knowledge-
intensive services to the firms of the region, particularly to SMEs and weaker 
firms. In particular, the main functions of the poles and the key objectives of the 
policy interventions were explicitly listed in one of the documents prepared by the 
regional government (Regione Toscana, 2010):  
1. To promote and meet the demand for innovation on the part of local firms, 
particularly SMEs and weaker firms, which were not able to express such 
a demand; 
2. To expand the number of firms accessing high value-added knowledge-
intensive services in order to promote the diffusion of innovation across 
pole members and with external firms; 
3. To help firms gain access to scientific and technological knowledge and to 
networks and resources at both national and international levels; and 
4. To support the sharing of equipment and of research, development, testing, 
and certification labs. 
Each consortium was led by a managing organisation, which, according to the re-
gional law, should be either a publicly owned innovation centre (business devel-
opment service centre or the like) or an association between one or more innova-
tion centres, universities, or research centres and, eventually, private firms. The 
members of the managing organisation should have been located in the region. 
The consortium decided what services the pole would provide and how its many 
other activities would be organised.  
The key technologies/applications identified by the regional government, 
in which the poles were specialised, are those in which the region has long hosted 
traditional industrial districts or innovative clusters of firms. In recent years, the 
number of these firms has reduced drastically because of both the crisis and the 
changes in market demand and global competition. Especially in regard to tradi-
tional made in Italy productions (e.g. fashion and furniture), in which many re-
gional firms are specialised, the products that remain (and may remain) competi-
tive are high-end products, for which innovation in its various forms is fundamen-
tal (Belussi and De Propris, 2013; Bellandi and De Propris, 2015). Through the 
creation of innovation poles, the regional government wished to stimulate the 
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emergence of a new kind of intermediary that could support the upgrading and the 
innovative capacity of firms in the region, particularly those SMEs that had little 
understanding of their needs and were unable to express a demand for innovation.  
The region already hosted a network of intermediaries that provided ser-
vices to SMEs. They were mostly public or public–private innovation centres that 
often specialised in a particular sector or technology. However, only some of them 
offered knowledge-intensive services, while others provided more traditional ser-
vices. Moreover, most of them had few relationships with important sources of 
knowledge, such as universities and research centres. According to the policy-
maker’s objectives, the poles should be a new type of innovation intermediary, 
having both the applied knowledge of the previous innovation centres and the 
knowledge and competencies of universities and research centres.  
The policymaker expected the poles to expand the pool of users of innova-
tion services. By contacting firms and mapping their needs, the poles would help 
them to find the most appropriate knowledge-intensive services. In so doing, 
SMEs would improve their innovation capabilities, which would generate positive 
spillovers in the regional innovation system. For the first three years, the poles 
were experimental in character. Afterwards, having evaluated their performance, 
the policymaker would decide how to structure subsequent interventions. The pol-
icymaker’s idea was that during the first three years, the poles should have struc-
tured their activities. Subsequently, public funding would decline until it disap-
peared, and the poles would have to cover their activities with market revenues. 
In parallel with the funding of the innovation poles, the regional government also 
provided innovation vouchers to regional SMEs which intended to purchase vari-
ous types of knowledge-intensive services. These innovation vouchers had been 
launched in 2008 and, when granted1, covered 20%–60% on the cost of the ser-
vice. If the service was purchased from one of the innovation poles, the voucher 
covered 80% of the cost of the service. Firms that intended to use an innovation 
pole’s services would have to gain membership of that pole. For each pole that 
 
 
1 Admission to the incentive was semi-automatic: It was based on compliance with a set of formal 
criteria, including company size. 
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was selected for funding, Table 1 lists its key technology/application, the number 
of organisations in the consortium, and the number of member firms at the start 
(30.6.2011) and end (30.6.2014) of the three-year period. 
 
Table 1. Key technologies/applications, consortium participants, pole members  
Innovation pole 
(acronym) 
Key technologies/applications N. of 
organisatio
ns in the 
consortium 
N. of 
member 
firms as of 
30.06.2011 
N. of 
member 
firms as of  
30.06.2014 
OPTOSCANA Optoelectronics for manufacturing and 
aerospace 
2 67 92 
INNOPAPER Paper 1 89 139 
OTIR 2020 Fashion (textiles, apparel, leather, 
shoes, jewellery) 
7 223 501 
VITA Life science 8 41 158 
PIETRE Marble 4 52 122 
PENTA Shipbuilding and maritime technology 5 225 352 
POLIS Technologies for sustainable cities 8 228 643 
NANOXM Nanotechnologies 6 70 128 
CENTO Furniture and interior design 6 177 322 
PIERRE Renewable energies and energy saving 
technology 
13 120 368 
POLO12 Mechanics, particularly for automotive 
and transport 
6 198 390 
POLITER ICT and robotics 13 195 697 
 
 
3.2. Funding and performance evaluation process 
Public funding was allocated to innovation poles in two instalments: up to 70% 
over the course of the three years and the rest at the end. The funding was 
conditional upon the attainment of a set of minimum performance targets, which 
had to be achieved by the end of the three-year period. The performance targets 
had been set at the start of the policy programme, and the poles were aware of 
these targets from the start. The tender stated that innovation poles would be 
assigned to one of three possible ‘bands,’ depending on how many members they 
had at the time of their launch. Different performance targets were set for the 
different bands. For each innovation pole, targets were defined as minimum 
thresholds with respect to several indicators (see also Table 2):  
i) percentage increase in the number of member firms;  
ii) number of member firms that received knowledge and technology 
mapping services; and  
iii) number of services provided to firms and revenue from the sale of 
services. 
11 
Table 2. Performance targets and maximum funding that could be claimed by innovation 
poles in each of the three bands 
 Criterion 
for 
allocation 
into 
bands: 
Performance targets to be achieved within three years 
(minimum thresholds) 
Maximum 
funding that 
could be 
claimed from 
the Regional 
government 
 N. member 
firms (at 
launch) 
% 
increase 
in the 
number 
of  
member 
firms 
N. firms to 
be offered  
knowledge 
& 
technology  
mapping 
services   
N. 
knowledge-
intensive 
services to be 
offered 
 
Revenue 
from the 
sale of 
services 
 
Band 1 > 160 50% 160 40 500,000 € 800,000 € 
Band 2 > 80 50% 80 20 300,000 € 600,000 € 
Band 3 > 40 50% 40 10 150,000 € 400,000 € 
 
 
To comply with the first indicator, the poles had defined more or less 
structured procedures for searching and screening local firms. In most cases, such 
procedures were defined and implemented by the poles’ managing organisations 
and, in particular, by the personnel of the innovation centres, who had previous 
knowledge of the regional firms. However, as the policymaker wanted the poles to 
expand the users of innovation services, the innovation centres (technology trans-
fer services and the like) were pushed to look outside of their own circles of con-
tacts. 
The knowledge and technology mapping service targeted by the second 
indicator referred to the analysis of the knowledge, skills, and technologies that 
firms used to produce their goods and services, and it was performed with the aim 
to identify possible problems and solutions. Check-ups were done at the member 
firms by personnel recruited by the poles specifically for performing this service. 
The poles had on average five people dedicated to this service. In most cases, the-
se individuals combined theoretical knowledge of a technological type (e.g. a de-
gree in engineering) with applied knowledge related to a specific sector. Some 
had a consultancy agreement with the pole’s managing organisation, while others 
were full-time employees of the pole’s managing organisation.  
Finally, in order to offer the knowledge-intensive services to which the 
third indicator refers, the poles relied on the skills, knowledge, and material 
infrastructure of their consortium members. 
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The information presented above and the analysis that will be developed in 
the following sections build upon several data sources, listed in Table A in 
Appendix, which the authors assembled as part of a research team engaged in the 
analysis of the policy programme.  
 
 
4. Misalignment between performance indicators and policy objectives 
4.1. Behavioural incentives created by performance indicators 
In order to identify any misalignment between the ultimate aims of the policy and 
the performance indicators that were set by the regional policymaker, we review 
the indicators in light of the objectives stated in the policy documents (Table 3). 
By establishing a logical link between the policy’s objectives, on the one hand, 
and the performance indicators designed by the regional policymaker, on the oth-
er, we can identify whether these indicators might have created behavioural incen-
tives that were misaligned with the policy objectives (Table 3, third column). 
 
Table 3. Policy objectives, performance indicators, and misaligned behavioural incentives 
Policy objective  
 
Performance indicators Indicator-induced behavioural 
incentives that are misaligned 
with policy objectives 
To promote and meet the de-
mand for innovation, particular-
ly from SMEs and weaker 
firms, which are unable to ex-
press such demand 
Minimum % increase in number 
of member firms  
Minimum number of new mem-
ber firms to be offered knowledge 
and technology mapping services  
Choosing firms that are easy to 
reach (e.g. firms that are known to 
them beforehand) rather than the 
weakest firms  
To expand the number of firms 
accessing high value-added 
knowledge-intensive services 
 
Minimum number of knowledge-
intensive services to be offered 
Minimum revenue from the sale 
of services  
Providing services to firms that 
are already accustomed to buying 
knowledge-intensive services ra-
ther than expanding the pool of 
service users 
To help firms gain access to 
scientific and technological 
knowledge and to networks and 
resources at national and inter-
national levels 
To support the sharing of 
equipment and certification labs  
-- Avoiding these activities (or in-
vesting very little effort in per-
forming them) because they are 
not relevant to performance as-
sessment  
 
 
The first policy objective—to promote a ‘demand for innovation’—was addressed 
by two indicators (minimum percentage increase in number of members and min-
imum number of new member firms to be offered knowledge and technology 
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mapping services) that measured the poles’ engagement in recruiting members 
and marketing services to them. These indicators focused on the direct outputs of 
the poles’ activities (they measured how many firms were approached) rather than 
on the outcomes achieved by the targeted SMEs in terms of improved awareness 
of available technologies and opportunities that could help them to innovate and 
increase their competitiveness. The indicators were, therefore, not completely 
aligned with the policy objective to solve the lack of information and awareness 
that affected local firms, and they may even have created behavioural incentives 
that undermined the attainment of this objective. In fact, in order to easily meet 
the performance target, the innovation poles could have chosen to approach firms 
that were easier to reach (for example, firms that were already known to the poles’ 
consortium members before the start of the poles’ activities), rather than the 
weakest firms—that is, firms that lacked not only specific knowledge, competen-
cies, and technologies but also the awareness of what knowledge, competencies, 
and technologies they would need in order to retain or improve their competitive-
ness.  
The second policy objective was to boost SMEs’ innovation capabilities 
by expanding the pool of firms accessing high value-added knowledge-intensive 
services. The guidelines provided by the regional policymaker stated that poles 
should have offered knowledge-intensive services to regional firms, particularly 
targeting firms that had not demanded services previously. The remaining two in-
dicators (minimum number of knowledge-intensive services to be offered and 
minimum revenue from the sale of services) were linked to this objective, alt-
hough, in this case as well, the link was very loose. These indicators focused on 
the direct outputs of the poles’ activities (they counted how many services were 
sold and their value) rather than on the outcomes achieved by the targeted SMEs 
in terms of the enlargement of the pool of users of knowledge-intensive services 
(poles offering services to SMEs that had not demanded them previously) and of 
the increase in the innovation capabilities of those that were already using those 
services (poles offering more advanced services to those firms that were already 
demanding services). The indicators were misaligned with the objective to expand 
the pool of firms accessing high value-added knowledge-intensive services and 
may even have created behavioural incentives that undermined this policy objec-
tive: In order to easily achieve the targets, the poles could have provided services 
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to firms that were already accustomed to buying knowledge-intensive services, ra-
ther than expanding the pool of users by offering services to firms that had not 
demanded them previously. 
The policymaker also intended to stimulate productive interactions in the 
innovation system by supporting firms’ access to scientific and technological 
knowledge and to networks and resources at both national and international levels 
and by supporting the sharing of equipment and certification labs. The poles 
should have supported these objectives by helping their members to participate in 
regional, national, and European R&D projects; by organising knowledge transfer 
programmes, workshops, and seminars to facilitate knowledge sharing and net-
working among members; and by managing their open-access infrastructure, such 
as the research laboratories present in the region. Instead, no performance indica-
tors were set that could be linked to these objectives. As a consequence, the inno-
vation poles might have decided not to perform these activities, or to invest very 
little effort in performing them, because they were not relevant to the evaluation 
of their performance. 
 
4.2. The behaviour of innovation poles in relation to their performance targets 
Table 4 summarises the results achieved by each innovation pole in the period 
2011–2014, ordered by band, and indicates (marked with an asterisk) those cases 
in which the targets had been achieved in less than 18 months (i.e. less than half 
of the duration of the programme). All poles had achieved all of their performance 
targets within two years. This might suggest either that the targets were probably 
too modest or that the intermediaries strategically implemented actions aimed at 
achieving the targets rapidly. Obviously, this is not a problem per se. In our case, 
the problem is that the target that the poles were trying to rapidly achieve was 
misaligned with respect to the ultimate policy goal. 
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Table 4. Performance targets and their achievement  
Innovation pole % increase in 
the number of 
member firms 
(above the 
minimum initial 
threshold for 
each band) 
Firms with 
knowledge and 
technology 
mapping 
Services 
provided 
Revenue 
 % n. n. € 
 
Minimum target for 
Band 1 
50% 160 40 500,000 
Poles’ final performance    OTIR 2020 213%* 278* 93 1,592,970* 
PENTA 120%* 236* 100 911,084* 
POLIS 303%* 274* 88 1,022,348* 
CENTO 101%* 190 115* 1,739,283* 
POLO12 146%* 249* 267* 1,924,012* 
POLITER 338%* 286* 191* 2,259,204* 
 
Minimum target for 
Band 2 
50% 80 20 300,000 
Poles’ final performance    INNOPAPER 73%* 94 455* 711,608* 
PIERRE 363%* 120 64* 1,082,638* 
 
Minimum target for 
Band 3 
50% 40 10 150,000 
Poles’ final performance    OPTOSCANA 130%* 56 42* 312,210* 
VITA 295%* 73* 31 249,893* 
PIETRE 205%* 81 18 1,799,400* 
NANOXM 222%* 44* 25 880,223* 
Note to table: * Poles that achieved the target within the first three semesters of activity. Reference period: 1st 
July 2011-30th June 2014 
 
Because the performance targets had been set at the start of the programme, and 
the performance of all 12 poles was measured by means of the same set of 
indicators, it is not possible to investigate whether the poles’ behaviour, given 
these targets, was different from the way in which they would have behaved in the 
absence of these targets, or the behaviour they would have had if different targets 
and indicators had been used to measure their attainment. The lack of a control 
group that was not subjected to the same targets prevents us from analysing the 
direct effects of the targets on the poles’ behaviour. Instead, we analyse whether 
the poles adopted the three types of misaligned behaviours shown in Table 3 and 
to what extent these behaviours were more prevalent in the period before the 
target had been attained than in the period following its achievement. To analyse 
whether the poles recruited members among firms that were easy to reach, we 
consider the share of member firms that had participated together with one or 
more of the poles’ consortium members in previous regional policy interventions 
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and, thus, were already known to the poles’ consortium before the start of the 
policy, over the total number of member firms.  
We found that, on average, 7.2% of member firms had already cooperated with 
the poles’ consortium members in previous funded projects. This percentage rises 
for some poles that were very active in previous policies, such as Optoscana, Otir 
2020, or Innopaper. During their three years of activity, the poles’ consortia 
continued to attract firms that had been their partners in previous policies, but at a 
decreasing rate: from 10.8% in the first semester of activity to 2.6% in the last 
semester. Table 5 shows the average shares of member firms that had interacted 
with the poles’ consortia in previous regional policy interventions, also 
distinguishing between the periods before and after the target had been reached. 
Two poles (Pietre and Pierre) achieved their membership targets at the start of the 
programme, so the comparison could not be performed. Of the remaining ten 
poles, nine had recruited a greater share of members that were already known to 
the consortium before achieving the target, while this share dropped once the 
target had been achieved. This suggests that most poles strategically recruited 
members among their existing networks in order to more rapidly reach their 
targets. Across all the poles, the average share of firms that had participated 
together with one or more of the poles’ consortium members in previous regional 
policy interventions was 10.3% before the targets’ achievement and 2.0% after the 
targets’ achievement, and this difference was significant at 5% (p-value 0.023). 
 
Table 5. Share of member firms that had participated in previous regional policy 
interventions together with one or more of the poles’ consortium members 
   Share of firms  
Pole 
In total Before achieving 
the target  
After achieving the 
target 
Difference 
before/after 
achieving the target 
OPTOSCANA 21.1% 33.3% 0.0% + 
INNOPAPER 9.2% 7.4% 0.0% + 
OTIR 2020 9.8% 16.4% 3.4% + 
VITA 7.7% 14.5% 3.4% + 
PIETRE 8.5% - 3.7% n.a. 
PENTA 2.1% 0.9% 0.8% + 
POLIS 5.5% 9.9% 2.0% + 
NANOXM 13.3% 12.3% 1.1% + 
CENTO 3.4% 2.6% 0.4% + 
PIERRE 8.0% - 4.6% n.a. 
POLO12 5.1% 5.3% 1.3% + 
POLITER 8.4% 0.0% 3.1% - 
Average 7.2% 10.3% 2.0%  
Note to table: Reference period: 1st July 2011-30th June 2014 
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To analyse whether the poles provided services to firms that were already 
accustomed to demanding them, we considered the share of services provided to 
firms that had already received a voucher to buy knowledge-intensive services 
before demanding a service from the poles, on the total number of services 
provided by the latter. 
On average, over one third (35.2% or 206 firms) of the 586 member firms 
that bought services from the poles had already requested services from the previ-
ous policy programme. As shown in Table 6, 27.2% of the number of services 
provided by the poles were bought by these firms. Moreover, 41.5% of the value 
of these services were generated by these deals. Therefore, these firms demanded 
more expensive (which generally meant more complex and more knowledge-
intensive) services than the other member firms. It is also interesting to observe 
that half of the firms that had already requested services from the previous policy 
programmes went on to demand the same type of services from the poles. For the-
se firms, the poles appear to have simply crowded out other service providers.  
 
Table 6. Services provided to firms that were already accustomed to demand knowledge-
intensive services 
Pole 
On total 
number of 
services 
On total 
value of 
services 
OPTOSCANA 15,4% 0.7% 
INNOPAPER 8,0% 28.3% 
OTIR 2020 47,2% 79.7% 
VITA 8,8% 17.9% 
PIETRE - - 
PENTA 34,3% 48.5% 
POLIS 49,5% 57.1% 
NANOXM 37,2% 29.9% 
CENTO 46,7% 58.5% 
PIERRE 25,0% 25.4% 
POLO12 24,4% 42.4% 
POLITER 45,3% 55.0% 
Average 27,2% 41.5% 
Note to table: Reference period: 1st July 2011-30th June 2014. Data for Pietre are missing. 
 
Table 7 compares the share of services that were provided to firms that 
had already requested services from the previous policy programme, in the two 
periods before and after the targets on the number and value of services were 
achieved. Columns 1 and 2 report the share of knowledge-intensive services 
provided to firms that were already accustomed to demanding knowledge-
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intensive services, before and after the target on the number of services was 
achieved. All poles for which data are available provided a higher share of 
services to firms that were already accustomed to demanding them before the 
achievement of the numbers target than afterwards.2 Across all poles for which 
data are available, the mean share of services provided to these firms is 42.1% 
before the achievement of the numbers target and 12.4% afterwards, and this 
difference is only marginally not significant (p-value 0.14). Columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 7 also show that the shares of knowledge-intensive services provided to 
firms that were already accustomed to demanding them were higher before the 
achievement of the value target than afterwards. Across all poles for which data 
are available, the mean share of the value of services provided to these firms was 
28.5% before the achievement of the value target and 8% afterwards, and this 
difference is significant at 10% (p-value 0.055).3 The evidence suggests that this 
behaviour could have been adopted instrumentally in order to achieve the value 
and numbers targets. 
 
Table 7. Share of services provided to firms that were already accustomed to demand 
knowledge-intensive services 
Pole Before 
achieving 
the targeted 
number of 
services 
After 
achieving 
the targeted 
number of 
services 
Difference Before 
achieving 
the targeted 
value of 
services 
After 
achieving 
the targeted 
value of 
services 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OPTOSCANA - 4.9% n.a.  - 4.9% n.a. 
INNOPAPER - 3.7% n.a. 5.9% 1.4% + 
OTIR 2020 80.0% 11.3% + 80.0% 11.3% + 
VITA - 37.8% n.a. 5.1% 1.2% + 
PIETRE - - n.a. - - n.a. 
PENTA 14.3% 12.5% + 41.5% 5.9% + 
POLIS - 14.6% n.a. 14.5% - n.a. 
NANOXM 44.4% 17.8% + - 17.8% n.a. 
CENTO - 7.1% n.a. - 13.4% n.a. 
PIERRE - 6.9% n.a. - 6.9% n.a. 
POLO12 - 7.8% n.a. 23.1% 4.6% + 
POLITER 29.6% 12.4% + 29.6% 12.3% + 
Average 42.1% 12.4%  28.5% 8.0%  
Note to table: Reference period: 1st July 2011-30th June 2014; n.a. stands for not available 
 
 
2 The comparison is possible for four poles only; this is because seven poles achieved th target immediately 
(during the first semester), and for another one, data were missing. 
3 In the case of the target on the number of services, the comparison is possible for six poles only; this is be-
cause four poles achieved the target immediately (during the first semester), one did not achieve the target, 
and for another one, data were missing. 
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To analyse whether the poles avoided activities whose performance was 
not measured by indicators, we consider the supply of services related to national 
and international networking and to the sharing of equipment and certification 
labs. Our interviews with the poles managing organisations suggest that 11 poles 
out of 12 carried out activities in order to support member firms’ access to 
scientific and technological knowledge and to networks and resources at the 
national and international levels. This would suggest that, despite the absence of 
specific performance indicators, the poles did perform these activities. However, 
our interviews also highlighted that the innovation poles did not systematically 
collect information about these activities. Moreover, about 40% of the member 
firms that we interviewed claimed to have been contacted by the poles only once, 
with the objective to recruit them as members. Therefore, the poles seem to have 
put limited effort into performing outreach activities beyond those that were 
measured by the performance indicators. 
Summarising, throughout the empirical analysis, we found some evidence 
that the performance indicators had only limited effectiveness in inducing the 
poles to behave in line with the policy’s objectives. The poles built their network 
of members by extensively relying on their network of pre-existing connections, 
rather than looking to support also the many other weakest firms of the region. 
Many of the services were provided to firms that had already demanded services 
beforehand, instead of looking to expand the pool of users of these services. We 
found that 35.2% of the firms that demanded services from the poles would have 
been able to buy them even without the intermediation of the poles, because they 
had already bought knowledge-intensive services using a pre-existing policy in-
centive. Moreover, half of these firms bought exactly the same services from the 
poles that they had bought from other service providers before the poles were in-
troduced: In regard to these firms, the poles simply crowded out other service 
providers instead of providing different services. Finally, activities for which per-
formance targets had not been set were carried out only to a limited extent. As a 
note of caution, we must say that while the chosen performance indicators seem to 
have incentivised the poles to behave in ways that were misaligned with the poli-
cy’s objectives, this does not mean that the policy as a whole was not impactful. 
Establishing the extent to which the policy had an additional impact would require 
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an appropriate ex post evaluation, possibly including a counterfactual analysis 
(see, for instance, Bellégo and Dortet-Bernadet, 2014).  
 
5. Towards a better approach to evaluating the performance of innovation 
intermediaries 
As discussed in detail in the previous section, the performance indicators used by 
the regional government had several limitations. First, they were incomplete 
because they focused on only some of the poles’ activities. Second, they were not 
explicitly designed to support the achievement of policy objectives, being focused 
on some direct and short-term outputs of the poles’ activities rather than on 
longer-term outcomes attained by the SMEs that the intermediaries were supposed 
to support. Much of the recent debate on the evaluation of intermediaries’ 
performance concerns the need to introduce outcome indicators that capture 
significant changes in the behaviours of beneficiary firms and significant social 
and economic effects at various levels of analysis (Knockaert et al., 2014). 
However, the problem of alignment with policy objectives remains: In order to 
define effective performance indicators (especially, but not only, when they are 
used to allocate public funding), policymakers need to ensure not only that 
indicators focus on outcomes rather than solely on outputs but also that these 
indicators align closely with the policy’s objectives.  
To encourage the innovation poles to act in accordance with the policies’ 
objectives outlined by the regional government, the indicators used for 
performance evaluation should have captured whether (i) poles had increased 
firms’ awareness of available technologies suited to their innovation needs, 
particularly regarding SMEs and firms that had a lower propensity to innovate; (ii) 
poles had expanded the pool of firms accessing high value-added knowledge-
intensive services; and (iii) poles had helped firms to access scientific and 
technological knowledge and networks and resources at the national and 
international levels, including equipment and certification labs. 
These indicators could have measured not only the outputs of the poles’ 
activities, both direct and indirect ones (i.e. follow-up activities that resulted from 
the former), but it would also have been important to include, if the policy’s time 
scale allowed it, the outcomes achieved by the beneficiary firms thanks to the 
poles’ activities. In fact, the beneficiary firms could have improved their 
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capabilities to engage in innovation (for example, through better communication 
and negotiating skills, greater awareness of their own abilities and limitations, 
greater understanding of the process of collaboration, and greater trust and 
openness towards external collaborations), thanks to the resources (information, 
services, and contacts) and learning opportunities provided by the innovation 
poles. Therefore, outcome indicators could have measured whether, thanks to the 
poles’ activities, the economic actors had changed their behaviours (for example, 
in terms of the amount of networking activity, the types of partners they interacted 
with, and the type of innovation processes they performed) and possibly their 
performance (more innovation, greater profitability, and so on).  
In order to capture the actual contribution of the innovation poles to the 
changes in the behaviours of the beneficiary firms, outcomes can be evaluated not 
only descriptively but also causally through the counterfactual tools of the so-
called econometrics of programme evaluation (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). While 
the application of these tools to the field of the evaluation of intermediaries’ per-
formance is still in its infancy, they are gaining ground as a tool for the evaluation 
of innovation policy (see, for instance, Bellégo and Dortet, 2014; Innovate UK, 
2017). 
Table 8 summarises possible measures for the evaluation of the poles’ 
performance. The proposed measures are classified according to their policy 
objective and their type (direct and indirect output or outcome indicators). 
Compared to the indicators that were actually used in the policy programme under 
analysis, these indicators include a mix of output and outcome, short- and longer-
term indicators, which are purposefully aligned with the policy’s objectives. 
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Table 8. Policy objectives and proposed indicators 
Policy objectives Proposed indicators 
Poles should promote 
and meet the demand 
for innovation, par-
ticularly in SMEs and 
more fragile firms 
which were unable to 
express such demand 
Output: Number of new (not previously known) firms recruited; number and value 
of follow-up activities carried out with the firms recruited 
 
Output: Number of new (not previously known) firms mapped; number of new 
firms that were offered mapping services and that engaged in follow-up activities 
 
Outcome: Changes in firms’ innovation behaviour: changes in the nature and types 
of investments in innovation; changes in the nature and value of the research project 
proposals submitted and funded; changes in the firms’ innovation strategies 
Poles should ex-
pand the number 
of firms accessing 
high value-added 
knowledge-
intensive services 
 
Output: Number and value of services provided or intermediated by the innovation 
intermediary to firms that had not demanded this kind of service before or that had 
never demanded services; number and value of subsequent services provided to 
these firms 
 
Output: number and share of firms receiving services directly provided or mediated 
by the innovation intermediary that had not demanded this kind of service before or 
that had never demanded services; number of firms receiving services that requested 
further services 
 
Outcome: Changes in firms’ demand for knowledge-intensive services: changes in 
the number of firms demanding services; changes in the number and value of 
services demanded  
Poles should help 
firms gain access 
to scientific and 
technological 
knowledge and to 
networks and re-
sources at national 
and international 
levels 
 
Poles should support 
the sharing of 
equipment and 
certification labs  
Output: Number of events held (by type of event) and number of laboratories 
accessed through the poles’ intermediation; number and value of follow-up 
activities carried out with these firms (e.g. applications to call and support for start-
up creation) 
 
Output: Number of firms participating in events; number of new firms that accessed 
laboratories; number of firms involved in events/labs activities and that engaged in 
follow-up activities  
 
Outcome: Changes in firms’ networking behaviour: changes in the size and 
composition of networks of relationships; changes in the number and types of 
collaborative projects 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In recent years, policymakers have relied on intermediaries to stimulate firms’ in-
novation capabilities by helping them to acquire new knowledge, competencies, 
and technologies. In addition, such intermediaries can play an important role in 
stimulating virtuous interactions between actors within an innovation system, and 
they can strengthen the innovation system as a whole. However, if the intermedi-
aries’ incentives are not aligned with the pursuit of these objectives, there are few 
reasons to believe that these objectives will be achieved. 
Our analysis shows that the indicators (and related performance targets) 
used in the policy under study suffered from several common shortcomings that 
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were already identified by the public policy literature and were not fully in line 
with the policy’s objectives. The intermediaries’ behaviour was, at least in part, 
affected by the attempt to achieve the performance targets on which funding was 
conditioned, which led to a misalignment with the policy objectives. First, the 
indicators measured only some of the poles’ activities and not others, possibly due 
to the greater difficulty in setting indicators for less well-defined activities, such 
as networking and project development. This incentivised the poles to focus more 
on those activities that were measured, further confirming that ‘only what gets 
measured gets done’ (Davies, 1999). Second, the indicators focused on short-term 
outputs that were considered desirable in themselves (Langford et al., 2006; 
Comacchio and Bonesso, 2012), such as recruiting a minimum number of 
members and providing a minimum number of services, rather than on more 
complex, less quantifiable outcomes aligned with policy objectives. This led poles 
to recruit members that were easier to reach, rather than focusing on the weakest 
firms, and to offer knowledge-intensive services to firms that did not necessarily 
need the intermediation of the poles, rather than spreading these services to new 
users. 
This analysis allows us to draw some more general implications for the 
design of performance indicators that would encourage intermediaries to address 
the policy’s objectives most appropriately.  
First, policymakers should identify the full range of intermediaries’ 
activities and pay particular attention to those that are instrumental in addressing 
the key objectives, thereby avoiding the risk of omitting important activities from 
the evaluation just because they are less visible or less easy to measure.  
Second, to be fully aligned with policy objectives, performance indicators 
should ultimately measure whether the beneficiary firms have achieved relevant 
policy outcomes thanks to the resources (information, services, and contacts) and 
learning opportunities provided by the intermediaries. Policy outcomes typically 
involve improvements in the beneficiary firms’ capabilities to engage in 
innovation (for example, through better communication and negotiation skills, 
greater awareness of their own abilities and of their limitations, greater 
understanding of the process of collaboration, and greater trust and openness 
towards external collaborations), which, in turn, would lead to changes in their 
behaviours (for example, greater networking activity, changes in the types of 
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partners they interact with, and changes in the type of innovation processes they 
perform) and possibly in performance (more innovation, greater profitability, and 
so on).  
The design of performance indicators is constrained by the presence of 
several trade-offs, which do not always allow such a broad-ranging approach to 
performance evaluation. First, accurate indicators often mandate the collection of 
a large amount of information, which requires intermediaries to invest a 
substantial proportion of their resources in the evaluation process; intermediaries 
often consider this data collection activity a burden which limits their ability to 
engage in more productive activities. The provision of appropriate digital 
information collection systems as part of the policy evaluation toolkit would help 
intermediaries to collect the data needed for performance evaluation without the 
need to invest their own resources in expensive data collection processes. A well-
designed performance-based funding system would simultaneously provide 
intermediaries not only with appropriately designed indicators, which avoid the 
creation of misaligned behavioural incentives, but also with accurate systems to 
support their strategic management, which would allow them to easily collect the 
data needed to build these indicators. 
Second, in order to fully capture policy outcomes, indicators may also 
require that measurement occurs a long time after the policy intervention has been 
completed, but this long timescale may not be feasible when the evaluation is 
supporting the allocation of public funding and, therefore, needs to be finalised in 
a relatively short period. In these cases, to avoid excessive complexity, the 
policymaker could focus on output indicators that are strongly aligned with the 
desired outcomes of the policy (while not capturing these policy outcomes fully).  
Despite the growing number of policies funding innovation intermediaries, 
limited evidence exists regarding how these issues have been addressed in 
practice. Further research should explore a greater range of practices adopted in 
the areas of indicator design and information collection systems supporting the 
activities and evaluation of innovation intermediaries and the extent to which 
these practices are linked to better performance of intermediaries and greater 
achievement of policy objectives. 
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Appendix 
 
Annex 1. Data sources  
Type of data Source 
Data on poles’ 
structure and 
activities 
− Administrative data provided by Tuscany’s regional government (poles’ six-
months activity reports and other administrative data) 
− Poles’ websites (collected in September – January 2015) 
− 27 semi-structured interviews with staff from the organisations managing the 
innovation poles, some member firms and local business associations (carried 
out between March and May 2014)  
Data on member firms − Administrative data provided by Tuscany’s regional government (data on the 
policy providing grants to buy knowledge-intensive services) 
− Interviews to poles’ member firms, carried out between September and 
November 2015 
Data on regional 
administration 
− Administrative data provided by Tuscany’s regional government (funding 
schemes for poles and member firms) 
− 4 interviews with policymakers (carried out between March and May 2014) 
Data on 2000-2006 
innovation policies 
− Previous research projects of the authors  
 
 
 
 
